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When and Why Did the Human Self Evolve? 
  The construct of self is central to psychology and allied disciplines. This construct has 
captivated and enchanted philosophers and scientists, religious and political figures, writers 
and poets. The self has been hailed as the basis of motivation, emotion and behavior, and has 
also been heralded as the key to a deeper understanding of human nature. At the same time, 
the self has been mystified as enigmatic and fleeting, and has also been vilified as a direct 
route to personal miseries and societal woes. 
  Given the increasing relevance of natural selection principles in psychology, it is not 
surprising that a construct as multifaceted and influential as the self has begun to attract the 
attention of those psychologists who are interested in the evolutionary origins of various 
human psychological attributes (e.g., Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995; Leary & Buttermore, 
2003; Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003). These psychologists conceptualize the human self as a 
trait that evolved in response to the environmental pressures that drive natural selection.  
  However, whether this conceptualization is likely to bear fruit is the subject of some 
debate. This debate is driven by the realization that our knowledge base concerning the 
conditions that influence the early evolution of humans is still thin. Consequently, one must 
make a number of plausible suppositions in an attempt to use principles of natural selection to 
understand the evolutionary origins of the self. For some researchers, such speculation—no 
matter how informed—is futile, and even potentially misleading. This is particularly true for 
those selection pressures, such as social organization, that leave only faint physical traces. For 
example, Bahn (1990, p. 75) argues: “I hate to break the news, but social organisation is 
unexcavatable, when the best one can hope for is a hypothesis based on inference and analogy 
… In fact it is quite possible that all the interpretations of Palaeolithic life yet put forward are 
hopelessly wrong, and in any case we shall never know which of them are correct.” 
  However, other researchers believe that the generation of informed speculation 
facilitates, and may even be necessary to, the development of an understanding of how 
evolution has shaped human psychological characteristics. As noted by Quiatt and Reynolds 
(1993, p. 262): “Anthropologists who have managed perfectly to subdue their imagination 
make dull company. Only informed speculation can give us a sense of how our society Evolution of the Human Self  3  
evolved.” 
  In this chapter we side, rather unapologetically, with the latter of the two debate 
camps. After all, evolutionary theorizing and hypothesis-generation pertain to the design and 
functions of psychological attributes rather than ancestral conditions. We use our current 
understanding of the self and combine it with the work of paleoanthropologists, 
primatologists, archaeologists, and archeolinguists to offer informed speculations about the 
evolutionary origins of the self. These speculations will include consideration of facets of the 
self that may have been subjected to the pressures of natural selection, why those facets might 
have been selected, and when (in evolutionary time) these self-facets may have begun to 
evolve. We conclude the chapter with a description of some of the empirical implications of 
these ideas. 
Defining and Characterizing the Self 
  Before we address these evolutionary ideas, however, we would first like to define 
and characterize the construct, the self, that is the focus of this chapter. We are specifically 
concerned with the evolution of the symbolic self. This term refers to both the ability to 
consider the self as an object of one’s own reflection and the ability to store the products of 
such reflections (which may be abstract and/or language-based) in memory. We do not claim 
that the abilities comprising this adaptation are uniquely human. Instead, we accept that, in 
evolution, an attribute rarely arises de novo. That is, evolution generally proceeds by re-
working, amplifying, or diminishing existing characteristics. One consequence is that there is 
often a fundamental continuity between related species. This continuity implies that evidence 
of the precursors of a symbolic self, or even a rudimentary symbolic self, should be found in 
other species, especially those that are close to humans on the bush of evolution. Indeed, 
recent evidence now suggests that higher primates (e.g., chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, 
gorillas) do possess rudimentary forms of a symbolic self-representation (Mitchell, 2003). 
However, this evidence also indicates that the human self is substantially more complex than 
the self possessed by other higher primates (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997; Skowronski & 
Sedikides, 1999). 
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human self has three interrelated capacities (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000). One capacity is 
representational: The self serves as the repository of mental structures that store and organize 
self-relevant information. These self-relevant representational structures can be concrete or 
abstract, negative or positive, and can depict the past (e.g., autobiographical memories), 
present (e.g., how our writing of this chapter is currently going), or future (e.g., aspirations 
and possible selves). The representations can also include meta-cognitions (e.g., ideas about 
how others perceive one’s behavior), information referring to dyadic relationships, 
information about one’s position within the group, and information about intragroup 
dynamics and intergroup relations. Furthermore, the representations might contain attributes 
that can be: (1) unique and distinct from attributes that characterize related others or ingroup 
members (personal self), (2) shared with a related other (relational self), or (3) shared with 
the ingroup (collective self) (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). 
  The second capacity of the self is executive and involves the regulation of its relation 
with the social and physical environment. Three classes of motives play a crucial role in 
guiding this capacity (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000; Sedikides, Skowronski, & Gaertner, 
2004): valuation (i.e., protecting and enhancing the self), learning (i.e., pursing a relatively 
accurate image of the self, improving skills and abilities), and homeostatic (i.e., seeking and 
endorsing information that is consistent with the self). We will discuss these motives at 
length later in the chapter. 
  Finally, the third capacity of the self is its reflexivity, defined as the organism’s ability 
to depict itself in its ongoing relation with other objects. Reflexivity is manifested in the 
interplay between the representational and executive capacities. For example, reflexivity 
allows the organism to alter long-term goals and render them congruent with anticipated 
environmental changes. Because of this reflexive capacity, the organism can respond flexibly 
and dynamically to environmental changes, such as alterations in social contingencies by 
selectively activating or de-activating portions of stored self-knowledge. More generally, the 
interplay of the representational, executive, and reflexive capacities allows the organism to 
process information in a way that is detached from the immediate environment, travel 
mentally in time, imagine and contemplate the future, simulate the consequences of own Evolution of the Human Self  5  
actions, and take preparatory steps for what might come as well as reparative measures for 
what has come. The interplay of these three capacities accounts for much of what it means to 
be human. We will elaborate on features of this interplay in the second half of the chapter, 
where we consider the evolutionary significance of the motives that influence the executive 
self. 
A Timeline of Human Evolution 
  Having addressed definitional issues, we now turn to the consideration of a timeline 
for human evolution. The construction of such a timeline serves as a context that greatly 
facilitates one’s ability to locate the emergence of the human self. However, the proposal of 
such a timeline is a tricky business. Successive paleoanthropological discoveries necessitate 
the continuous updating of timelines and speciation patterns. Indeed, evidence that has been 
reported since we previously reviewed the timeline of human evolution (Sedikides & 
Skowronski, 1997) prompts us now to update and refine that timeline. 
  While change might appear to be gradual on geologic time scales, when considering 
smaller time slices evolution often proceeds in series of fits and starts in which change is 
disorderly and non-linear (Caporael, in press; Klein, 1999; Klein & Edgar, 2002; Lahr & 
Foley, 1998; Leary & Buttermore, 2003; Tattersall, 2000). One reason for this disorderly 
pattern is that the environmental conditions that drive natural selection often change in a 
disorderly and non-linear manner. Indeed, human evolution occurred in such a context, with 
periods of relative stability intermingled with dramatic and global climatic fluctuation. These 
fluctuations altered climates (from glacial to more temperate and vice versa) and changed 
ecosystems (from forests to grasslands to deserts). Geological activity (e.g., volcanic 
eruptions) may have similarly served to alter local climactic conditions, and may have even 
had global climactic consequences. 
  As noted earlier, it is commonly believed that this climatic instability critically 
influences evolution. For example, Caporael (in press) argues: 
“There is not slow gradual progress of a single lineage evolving through time in a 
stable [environment]. Instead, the evidence indicates changing environments and 
habitats breaking up. Fragments of populations would become isolated. They might Evolution of the Human Self  6  
speciate from the parent population through gradual selection to a new or changing 
environment, stay unchanged by following their preferred habitats, or simply become 
extinct. On the ground, evolution is … the complex responses between climate, 
biogeography and populations that may fragment, expand and collapse.” (p. XX). 
  In this regard, consider some of the climactic changes that occurred in the context of 
the evolution of our human ancestors and some of the changes in our human ancestors that 
are correlated with such changes. Approximately 7 million years ago (mya), the warm 
rainforests of Africa were populated by a remarkable diversity of apes. Between 6.5-6 mya 
(end of the Miocene era), an acute temperature drop occurred. Woodland and savannah began 
displacing rainforest. During this same time, almost all of the Miocene apes went extinct. One 
surviving lineage, however, is thought to be a common ancestor to contemporary apes and 
humans (Haile-Selassie, 2001). By 5 mya (with the temperature rising), and with evolution 
proceeding, diversification in the ape lineages is again observable. One of these lineages was 
apparently especially well-suited for life in seasonal habitat and for consumption of gritty 
food. This lineage is thought to have given rise to bipedal apes with relatively small-sized 
brains relative to body mass, the best known of which are the australopithecines. Indeed, 
evidence from the most famous australopithecus, Lucy (Australopithecus afarensis), reveals a 
brain only slightly larger than a chimpanzee’s. 
  The australopithecines were specialized for both walking and tree climbing and, 
consequently, were well suited to life in diverse habitats (e.g., savannah, forest). They had 
ape-like bodies with cone-shaped trunks and narrow shoulders. They were characterized by 
substantial sexual dimorphism (i.e., males were bigger than females), suggesting male 
competition for females and less male parental investment. They also likely had the 
intelligence for crude tool-making (e.g., wooden implements). The austrolapithecines were 
also thought to be a relatively social species whose members spent at least some time in the 
company of other conspecifics.  
  It is currently believed that Australopithecus afarensis spawned at least six species, 
including Paranthropus boisei, Homo rudolfensis, and Homo habilis. The appearance of 
Homo habilis, approximately 2.5 mya, coincided with a general cooling of the environment, Evolution of the Human Self  7  
which resulted in another recession of the rainforest and re-emergence of the savannah. It has 
been argued that the lack of rainforest safety and the ecological demands of the grasslands 
precipitated the achievement of evolutionary milestones such as the development of simple 
stone tools (i.e., splintered rocks). There is also evidence that these Homo habilis hominids 
carried their tools from site to site, even when these sites were separated by several 
kilometers, and reused these tools. Moreover, these tools (Oldowan choppers and handaxes) 
appear to have had multiple purposes, which included cutting flesh from bones and smashing 
bones open for the marrow (Potts, 1984). The evidence for tool-reuse and tool-carrying 
suggests the presence of at least two critical mental capacities. First, Homo habilis species 
members must have been able to anticipate the future. Second, these hominids were capable 
of some form of meta-cognition, as they would need to cue themselves for remembering 
where tools were abandoned or hidden and for hiding them in predetermined places. Indeed, 
the proposal for emergent meta-cognitive abilities among Homo habilis is compatible with 
their slightly larger brain to body size ratio (when compared to the australopithecines), and a 
trend toward change in their diet, namely increased consumption of meat (Tobias, 1987).  
  Current reconstructions of hominid evolution suggest that between 1.8-1.7 mya, 
Homo habilis had given way to Homo ergaster, which spread out of Africa and by 1 mya had 
evolved into Homo erectus. It is now believed that the latter species was an evolutionary 
dead-end that later became extinct in Asia (Klein & Edgar, 2002), but we will discuss the two 
species in combination given the similarities in their anatomical characteristics, cognitive 
faculties, and lifestyle. Homo ergaster/erectus had a less ape-like appearance, with longer 
legs, a smaller pelvis, a moisture-conserving external nose, and a barrel-shaped chest. Indeed, 
the body of Homo ergaster/erectus had lost the specialization for climbing, was fully adapted 
for terrestrial life, and was particularly well adapted for life in hot and dry climates. In 
particular, exposure of more surface area (relative to body mass) for cooling the body and 
brain likely contributed to effective thermal regulation, whereas the small pelvis facilitated 
more efficient walking. Additionally, sexual dimorphism decreased, with females getting 
bigger, suggesting that competition for females decreased while male parental investment 
increased. Evolution of the Human Self  8  
  It is likely that meat was a regular component of the diet of Homo ergaster/erectus 
species members. This high-quality nutrition made possible a significant reduction in 
intestine volume, thus allowing a shift of energy from the gut to the brain. In accord with this 
reasoning, this species had a large brain (i.e., neocortex) relative to body size. Evidence for a 
corresponding increase (Jerison, 1973) in the cognitive ability of Homo ergaster/erectus is 
manifested in several ways. First, this species was able to maintain naturally-occurring fires 
and, by 790 thousand years ago (kya), to start and control fires (Goren-Inbar et al., 2004). 
Second, the species was able to produce better stone tools. An example is the Acheulean 
bifaces, an almond-shaped wedge with a point and a butt at each end, which appeared to 
conform to the designer’s mental template rather than to trial-and-error stone knapping. 
Third, the species displayed unprecedented dispersion patterns. Specifically, Homo 
ergaster/erectus immigrated to many regions of the habitable world (e.g., Middle East, China, 
Indonesia, and Southern Europe). Fourth, this species was likely capable of at least 
rudimentary speech. Although there is some dispute about this, it has been claimed that 
Broca’s area appeared approximately 1.5 mya. However, some argue that the increase in the 
emergence of Broca’s area may simply reflect an amplified need for breath control, which 
was an original function of Broca’s area (although precise breathing control is also essential 
for both speech and singing).
1 At the very least, suggestive evidence of frequent 
communication (not necessarily using language) exists in the widespread use of fire and the 
standardization of stone tools. 
  It may be the case that deliberate nonverbal communication (e.g., pointing, gesturing, 
facial expression), referred to as mimesis by Donald (1991), might also have evolved during 
this time period. While it is possible that such nonverbal communication was the origin of 
spoken language, the emerging consensus is that language has vocal rather than gestural 
origins (Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycett, 2002). Nonetheless, even mimesis requires sophisticated 
mental capabilities. These include knowledge of: (1) what it is to be communicated (self-
reflection), (2) what others know (theory of mind), (3) what others need to know (tactical 
self-presentation), (4) how one would feel following the communicative message (affective 
forecasting), and (5) how or whether one would be in a position to control purposefully the Evolution of the Human Self  9  
message (knowledge of self-regulatory ability) (Gallup, 1997; Hopkins, 2000; Leary & 
Buttermore, 2003). Regardless of whether it was verbal or nonverbal, improved dyadic and 
group communication (for, say, hunting or foraging) likely facilitated both dispersion and 
successful group living. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Homo ergaster/erectus 
lived in larger groups than Homo habilis, groups characterized by flexible hierarchies with 
shifting roles and alliances (Aiello & Dunbar, 1993; Foley & Lee, 1989).  
  In summary, the larger neocortex in Homo ergaster/erectus coincided with relatively 
sophisticated tool-making and other markers of enhanced performance, suggesting enhanced 
cognitive abilities (Jerison, 1973), as well as with increasing social complexity and skill 
(Byrne & Whitten, 1988), thus facilitating efficient food acquisition strategies. We argue that 
these evolutionary milestones provided the foundation for the mental capabilities that were 
later combined to produce the emergence of the human self. 
  Homo heidelbergensis was a descendant of Homo ergaster or Homo erectus, 
appearing in Africa around 600 kya. This species is associated with somewhat refined tool 
production (i.e., the Late Acheulean hand axe) and increased communicative ability (at 
approximately 500 kya; Mithen, 2000). By 150-130 kya, a lineage of Homo heidelbergensis is 
thought to have given rise in Africa to Homo sapiens. At about 130 kya and during a 
glaciation period, it is thought that a limited population of Homo sapiens survived an 
evolutionary bottleneck (when death rates far exceed birth rates, with a concomitant drastic 
reduction in the number of individuals who contribute to the gene pool), leaving a relatively 
small set of approximately 10,000 breeding individuals. This remaining population expanded 
greatly at the beginning of the interglacial period and dispersed out of Africa to Europe, the 
Far East, and into the Americas around 70,000 years ago. The fossil record shows 
sophisticated tool production characterized by considerable variety of form and a high 
turnover (5-10 kya) of tool types from about 40 kya. This explosion in tool production is 
considered the signature of a larger neocortex. The fossil record also testifies to sophistication 
and variation in stone transport, diet, hearths, and built structures. Hunting and gathering 
techniques seem to have increased in complexity and efficiency, and so did group living and 
social networking. It is during this time, we would argue, that the modern human self had Evolution of the Human Self  10  
finally arrived in full. 
When Did the Human Self Originate? 
  While there is general agreement that the human self was certainly in place by 5-10 
kya (i.e., within what is effectively historical times), there is not agreement on the time when 
the human self initially began to emerge in a form that bears resemblance to the modern self. 
In fact, dating the emergence of the human self has recently generated some controversy.
2 In 
our earlier work (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997, 2003), we speculatively placed the origins 
of the human self in Homo erectus (or ergaster/erectus, according to the current taxonomy). 
As noted earlier, this species possessed a large and complex neocortex (manifested, in part, in 
advanced tool-making and fire control), pursued cooperative hunting with remarkable 
efficiency, witnessed the emergence of more advanced communicative and, eventually, 
linguistic capabilities, and demonstrated sophisticated social organization characterized by 
group stability, flexible social hierarchy, use of home bases for nomadic hunting, and 
widespread dispersion. We argued that, given the presence of these indicators of sophisticated 
cognitive abilities, it was plausible to surmise that a rudimentary human symbolic self had 
begun to evolve during this time. 
  Leary and Buttermore (2003) have challenged some of the bases of our conclusion. 
They argue that it is not clear how large or complex the brain needs to be in order to sustain a 
self, that cooperative hunting is exhibited by both primate (e.g., chimpanzee) and non-primate 
(e.g., wolves, wasps) species, and that Homo ergaster/erectus did not leave behind artifacts 
(e.g., art, religion, culture) that a researcher would normally associate with the human self. In 
contrast, Leary and Buttermore placed the emergence of the human (i.e., symbolic or 
conceptual) self in the late Paleolithic epoch (50-60 kya) as indicated by both the widespread 
emergence of technological advances (e.g., tools, clothing, housing, boats) and the 
widespread presence of artifacts (e.g., body adornment, art, ritualistic burial) in the 
paleoanthropological record. 
  We believe that debating the issue of origination of the symbolic self is not just a 
matter of satisfying intellectual curiosity, although this is an important matter. In addition, 
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is to the Homo species. Is the symbolic self an adaptation that appeared just 50 kya, or, 
alternatively, has the symbolic self been inextricably linked with practically the appearance of 
the Homo species? 
  Prompted by Leary and Buttermore’s (2003) thoughtful and constructive challenge, 
we would like to clarify our own position and to question their rationale for providing a date 
of 50-60 kya for the evolution of the human self. To begin with, our thesis was that only a 
rudimentary human symbolic self appeared in Homo erectus (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997, 
2003)—a thesis acknowledged by Leary and Buttermore. We surmise that this adaptation 
undertook substantial transformation before it matured into the modern (i.e., Homo sapiens) 
self. Nonetheless, we believe that the evidence supports the earlier date that we proposed for 
the emergence of the self, and we believe that we can effectively rebut Leary and 
Buttermore’s arguments.  
  For example, Leary and Buttermore (2003) asked how large the brain needs to be in 
order to sustain a self. Although we do not have a quantifiable answer to this question, we can 
respond to this question by weaving together several sources of evidence. The first of these 
suggests that cognitive capabilities were quite substantial in Homo ergaster/erectus. For 
example, there is a strong relation between intellectual ability and the ratio of brain size to 
body mass across mammals (Kuhlenbeck, 1973; Macphail, 1982). Given that there is a trend 
toward increasing brain size relative to body mass as the Homo genus moved from the 
Australopithecines to Homo sapiens, it is hard to avoid the inference that intellectual ability 
was also increasing during that time. This conclusion is especially hard to ignore when 
considered in combination with the paleoanthropological evidence suggesting that, as time 
progressed, hominids possessed increased ability to inhabit inhospitable environments, which 
would increase diversity in food procurement. In addition, the Homo ergaster/erectus 
neocortex enlarged relative to that of Homo habilis at a time when tool production, 
cooperative hunting, communication, and group living also took a great leap forward. These 
capabilities, in combination, are suggestive of the presence of symbolic information 
processing capabilities which are the heart of the symbolic self. In reply to such evidence, 
Leary and Buttermore point out that cooperative hunting exists in species that do not possess Evolution of the Human Self  12  
a human-like self. Indeed, we would be surprised if it did not exist, as we fully endorse the 
principle of cross-species continuity in many traits. In reply, we point out that our argument 
was that hunting in the Homo ergaster/erectus period was remarkably more complex and 
efficient than hunting in the Homo habilis period, thus suggesting improvement in underlying 
cognitive abilities. 
  An additional thrust of our argument concerned social organization and 
communication. Evidence suggests that group size began to rise substantially toward the end 
of the Homo ergaster/erectus period (i.e., approximately 1 mya; Aiello & Dunbar, 1993), 
increasing thereafter at a rapid rate. Living in relatively large groups contributes to the 
solution of many ecological or survival problems, but it also entails costs and challenges. For 
example, given the pressing feeding requirement of group members, the length of daily 
journeys undertaken by large groups can increase relative to those undertaken by smaller 
groups, thus incurring additional energy and time costs (Dunbar, 2003a); contests over access 
to and distribution of food can disrupt foraging (Dunbar, 2003a); and the expenditure of 
energy and time, along with food contests, can contribute to reduced fertility in females and 
lower birth rates (Bowman, Dilley, & Keverne, 1978). The challenges of group living are also 
social: Large groups require the investment of large amounts of time in social grooming in 
order to ensure their cohesion and functionality through times (Dunbar, 1991), which causes 
problems with adequate allocation of grooming time. Such time demands may necessitate role 
differentiation and increased structuring of groups (Dunbar, 1984; Kudo & Dunbar, 2001); 
the necessity for intragroup cooperation might also increase with group size, with the 
formation of dyadic alliances (Trivers, 1971) and the need to monitor other members’ 
contributions to the alliances, manage free-riders, detect cheaters and oneself exploit 
opportunities to cheat (Byrne & Whitten, 1988; Cosmides, 1989; Dunbar, 1999), all of which 
consume cognitive resources. In addition, effectively managing group-related behavior can 
entail ongoing social rank calculations and the tracking of shifting alliances (Harcourt, 1988), 
intensification of intrasexual competition for mates (Parker, 1987), and increased intergroup 
competition for resources (Ghiglieri, 1989). 
  Consider the mental abilities that would help an organism to navigate the demands of Evolution of the Human Self  13  
a large, complex, and ever-shifting social context. Effective functioning in such an 
environment would be facilitated by knowing who might be a “good fit” to one’s own 
abilities (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). This ability to predict whether one can effectively 
interact with others seems to require a good deal of self-understanding. Indeed, the need for 
such information may have contributed to the formation of a private self. In addition, an 
individual would benefit if he or she were able to perspective-take and know how she or he 
was perceived by others through reflected appraisal processes. These skills are also important 
when an individual wishes to present him or her self to other group members in a desirable 
manner when attempting to form alliances or ingratiate oneself into relationships. Such needs 
may contribute to the capacity to “know” what people are like and what they might want – in 
essence, a theory of mind. Beyond this, however, the effective detection of cheating requires a 
rather advanced theory of mind (i.e., knowing what the potential cheater thinks that I know; 
Dunbar, 2003b). Such a theory of mind would enable a cheater to manipulate the impressions 
conveyed to others by deliberately engaging in behaviors that would be seen as differing 
substantially from prototypical “cheating” behaviors. Thus, the need to effectively navigate 
the social world may also have contributed to the development of a theory of mind that could 
be useful in manipulating one’s own behavior via self-presentation – or to the development of 
what we now call the public self.  
  The social demands associated with group living can be thought of as selection 
pressures that drive evolution, and, in our view, it is important that such pressures coincided 
with the presence of augmented cognitive capacities in human evolution. Indeed, in support 
of this notion, the complexity of social organization is generally correlated with neocortex 
volume in anthropoid primates. Specifically, five indices of social complexity (i.e., group 
size, grooming clique size, utilization of social skills in male mating strategies, frequency of 
tactical deception, frequency of social play) correlate with relative neocortex volume 
(Dunbar, 2003a). Group size, in particular, correlates strongly with absolute neocortex 
volume (Dunbar, 2003a).  
  The implication, then, is that the computational demands of the complex social life of 
Homo ergaster/erectus may have been an important driving force in the evolution of human Evolution of the Human Self  14  
mental capabilities, selecting for a larger brain—and especially frontal lobe (Dunbar, 2003a). 
Why the frontal lobe? Self-reflective skills are related to the presence of a relatively large 
neocortex. Recent research suggests that this area of the brain has emerged as the locus of 
many processes (e.g., self-awareness, self-recognition, self-reflection) that are vital to a 
concept of the self (Feinberg, 2001; Kelley et al., 2002; Turk et al., 2002). 
  The evolution of the neocortex was also accompanied by the evolution of 
physiological structures necessary for language production (Aiello, 1996) and, hence, 
implicitly language understanding, since the use of language is itself indicative of a capacity 
for symbolic reasoning (a capability important to the human symbolic self). Indeed, a 
complex vocal apparatus and a brain capable of controlling it is one of the special provinces 
of hominids. In fact, it has even been argued that language drove physiological evolution, 
conferring advantages to those who were able to produce more complex language sounds 
(Bickerton, 1981). Regardless, the physiological evidence related to language production 
capabilities that has been amassed to this point again suggests an earlier rather than later date 
for the origins of the symbolic self.  
  As mentioned previously, brain casts have been interpreted as reflecting the 
emergence of Broca’s area as early as 1.5 mya. The evidence that Broca’s area was enlarged 
in the left hemisphere appears to indicate the beginnings of precise vocal control (Corballis, 
2003). Moreover, an expanded and lower larynx—which many claim is a physiological 
necessity for articulate speech—evolved in late Homo erectus (McHenry, 1992; Zeller, 
1992).
3 Other scholars (e.g., Aitchison, 1996) note that as Homo habilis evolved into Homo 
ergaster/erectus, their skulls altered in ways that would allow individuals to increase the 
variety and intricacy of the sounds they could produce. Examination of skeletons that are 
increasingly “modern” show a gradual enlargement of orifices in bones that can accommodate 
the nerves required to control complex speech. This trend begins pre-Homo sapiens, which 
suggests that some rudimentary language capability might also be evolving prior to the 
emergence of modern humans. 
  Curiously, there appears to be an interesting paradox in the lower larynx position that 
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speech, the low larynx makes human beings more susceptible to choking than any other 
species on the planet. From this paradox, some have concluded that, because the benefits of 
communication seem to outweigh the costs of choking, it is logical to assume that this larynx 
position is a key adaptation in the origin of language. As Scovel (1998, p. 43) argued: “So the 
linguistic advantages outweigh the physiological disadvantages of a lower larynx, and if the 
emergence of language is as vital to our evolutionary history as most anthropologists believe, 
and if language is so indispensable to our species, it is no exaggeration to claim that the 
descent of the larynx has permitted the ascent of mankind!”. However, it is possible that such 
alterations reflected pre-adaptations—changes that occurred for other reasons (e.g., the 
establishment of a lower vocal range that can strengthen the potency of threatening signals), 
and only later in evolution were these changes found to be advantageous for speech 
production (Nishimura,
 Mikami, Suzuki, & Matsuzawa, 2003). However, such arguments 
apply primarily to the positioning of the larynx, and can not easily explain the evolutionary 
timing of the increase in the size of the speech-controlling Broca’s area or the expansion in 
the size of the skull orifices that accommodate nerves related to speech production. Hence, 
the constellation of changes in hominid anatomy over time collectively implicate the 
relatively early evolution of complex vocal communication. This also implies the presence of 
symbolic thought, a cognitive component critical to the modern self. 
  Leary and Buttermore’s (2003) date of the evolutionary origins of the self at 60-50 kya 
was largely based on the emergence of the cultural “big bang” – a period of time in which 
glimmerings of human “selfness” seems to be evident in art production and ritual burial 
practices (see also Mithen, 2000). However, if Leary and Buttermore’s dating is correct, then 
no such evidence ought to exist prior to 50 kya. The record suggests otherwise. Evidence of 
culture, art, and burial has been generated from archaeological sites that are older, sometimes 
substantially older, than the Leary and Buttermore date.  
  At least three lines of evidence can be cited in this regard. The first of these concerns 
art objects. Recent finds from South Africa, including bone fragments and an engraved 
nodule of hematite, have now been dated to more than 77,000 years ago (d’Errico, 
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inhabitants of sites in South Africa and Cyrenaica in the middle Paleolithic period (as early as 
100 kya) made use of red ochre and specularite pigments and of seashells that were a by-
product of expanded food procurement practices in the production of carved artwork or 
personal adornment (Clark, 1989, 1995). However, some researchers claim that rock art 
objects may have an even older history. That is, although the evidence is disputed, some 
forms of rock art may be substantially older then the dates of the South African finds. For 
example, Marshack (1997) claimed that the “Berekhat Ram figurine” (a real carved object 
and not a product of natural forces) can be dated to at least 250,000 years ago. Bednarik 
(1998) reviewed additional evidence for the early emergence of art, noting that rock art 
consisting of cup marks and a meandering line hammered into the rock of a sandstone cave 
was produced in India two or three hundred thousand years ago and that, at about the same 
time, simple line markings were made on a variety of portable objects (bone, teeth, ivory, 
stone) in several locations. However, these particular examples remain subject to some 
dispute as to whether or not they are human-made. 
  A second line of evidence, related to the production of art, concerns personal 
adornment. Archaeologists have recently discovered that humans used paint for aesthetic 
purposes far earlier than previously thought. Specifically, over 300 fragments of pigment 
were found in a cave at Twin Rivers, near Lusaka, Zambia. This find included pigments and 
paint grinding equipment believed to date to 350-450 kya (Barham, 2002). The obvious 
significance of pigments is that they imply ornamentation, which is a sign of self-emergence. 
  A third line of evidence comes from burial practices. Although true burials (i.e., those 
associated with grave goods) are not found prior to ca 25 kya, several Neanderthal cave sites 
dated to 90,000 years ago provide what is considered to be the first plausible evidence of 
deliberate disposal of the dead (Stringer, Grün, Schwarcz, & Goldberg, 1989). In addition, 
Clark et al. (2003) reported that modern human crania from the Middle Awash in the Afar 
Rift, Ethiopia, date to 160-154 kya provided indications of deliberate mortuary practices 
(such as defleshing and polishing), which would push the date of burial practices back even 
farther. Moreover, at the early archaic human site of Atapuerca in Spain, there is evidence of 
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cave chamber by as early as 300 kya (although a more conservative date may be 150 kya; 
Arsuaga, Martinez, Gracia, Carretero, & Carbonell, 1993; Carbonell, Bermudez de Castro, 
Arsuaga, Díez, Rosas, Cuenca-Bescos et al. 1995; Nieves & Mendoza, 1993). If burial 
practices reflect a sense of self, as has often been claimed, then here we have additional 
evidence that puts an evolving sense of self substantially earlier than suggested by Leary and 
Buttermore (2003).   
  We also question Leary and Buttermore’s (2003) dating on other grounds. Given that 
language signifies the presence of symbolic or conceptual abilities, if Leary and Buttermore’s 
dating is correct, then no language ought to have evolved prior to approximately 50 kya. 
Although language probably arose in a series of stages rather than as single phenotypic or 
genotypic event (Aiello & Dunbar, 1993), it is also believed that language, in a relatively 
advanced form, had already evolved by 0.5 mya (Dunbar, 2003a). In addition, if language had 
evolved after 50 kya, it would be difficult to account for its universality across the human 
species today, since modern humans last shared a common ancestor some time prior to 70 kya 
when the main dispersal across the Arabian landbridge occurred. 
  In summary, we have argued on both evidential and logical grounds that the symbolic 
or conceptual self emerged well before the Upper Palaeolithic era. In our view, Leary and 
Buttermore’s (2003) claim that the emergence of the symbolic self is indexed by the cultural 
“big bang” around 50 kya is untenable in the face of the paleoanthropological evidence. 
Indeed, the current view leans more towards the suggestion by McBrearty and Brooks (2000) 
and others that the Upper Palaeolithic cultural revolution in fact began in Africa some prior to 
100 kya. The apparent explosion in Europe after 50 kya may thus have more to do with the 
fact that modern humans only arrived in Europe, complete with their Upper Palaeolithic 
culture, some time after 50 kya. Regardless of the fine details of this or any other explanation 
(such as Tattersall’s [1995] language push or Klein’s [1999] genetic mutation that caused a 
reorganization of the brain) for the sudden outburst of cultural diversity in Europe after 50 
kya, unless challenged by new evidence, we hold to our thesis that the human self was already 
substantively in place by the appearance of archaic humans round 500kya, and hence that its 
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ergaster/erectus period. 
Functions of the Human Self: The Case of Self-Evaluation Motives 
  What are the functions of the self that might have contributed to its maintenance and 
propagation? We previously defined the self in terms of the interplay of the representational, 
executive, and reflexive capacities. In discussing the executive capacity, we referred to three 
classes of self-evaluation motives: valuation, learning, and homeostasis. We will now discuss 
the adaptive utility of these motives for the self-system as well as relational living (Fletcher, 
Simpson, & Boyes, this volume) and group living (Brewer & Caporael, this volume; van 
Vugt & van Lange, this volume). 
  These motives influence the acquisition of self-relevant information. Given that 
maintenance and positive self-change is adaptive, it is not surprising that individuals are 
particularly sensitive to information that has implications for the self. For example, humans 
have a nonconscious processing sensitivity for stimuli pertaining to the self, are speedier in 
the processing of self-relevant than self-irrelevant descriptions, and show a better memory for 
self- than other-relevant information (Baumeister, 1998). In addition, the self affects the 
processing of social information. For example, when judging others on dimensions that are 
central to the self, individuals process the information deeply and draw a large number of 
rather extreme inferences about others (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1993). Moreover, the self is 
often projected upon others, especially when levels of ambiguity are relatively high (Green & 
Sedikides, 2001), and is implicated in the choice of friends or partners (Sedikides, 2003). 
  Humans, however, are not mere information recipients; they are also information-
seekers. Early hominid survival may have depended on the type of information sought and 
acquired from the environment and on how this information was interpreted and used in 
judgment and behavior. What kind of information did our ancestors want and need to know 
about themselves? This is where the three classes of self-evaluation motives, valuation, 
learning, and homeostasis (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997), would seem 
to be quite useful. The valuation motives are self-protection and self-enhancement. The self-
protection motive serves to filter out, negate, or discredit unfavorable self-relevant 
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favorable self-relevant information. The learning motives are self-assessment and self-
improvement. The self-assessment motive guides pursuit of accurate (unfavorable or 
favorable) self-knowledge, whereas the self-improvement motive guides pursuit of 
knowledge that has long-term improvement value. Homeostatic motivation is represented 
solely by self-verification. This motive guides pursuit or endorsement of self-consistent 
information (negative or positive). 
  We conceptualize the three classes of self-evaluation motives as prima facie instances 
of putative modular adaptations, thus assuming that they served specific adaptive purposes 
(Kurzban & Aktipis, this volume). In the sections below, we will elaborate on how these 
motives can induce cognitive, affective, and behavioral changes that are adaptive. Moreover, 
we propose that the motives evolved in response to individual, relational and group adaptive 
problems, and that they promoted the adaptive utility of the personal self while in the long run 
benefiting the relational and collective selves by improving the individual’s relational and 
group standing. Finally, once again, we posit that these motives initially emerged in the later 
Homo ergaster/erectus period. 
On the Adaptiveness of Self-Evaluation Motives 
  Numerous adaptive benefits can accrue from the action of the valuation motives. 
Choice of tasks (e.g., hunting, alliance formation, challenge to higher-ranked conspecifics) is 
a prime example. Valuation motives can influence individuals to avoid tasks with a high 
probability of failure (and hence, a threat to the self) and to select tasks with a high 
probability of success (and hence a boost to the self), assuming that expected task utility or 
fitness effects were comparable in the two cases. It follows that maximum benefit for the self 
would be produced by selection of tasks that entail an optimum combination of task success 
and fitness payoff. Additionally, protection or boosting of the self can be achieved by the 
interaction of valuation motives with the representational and reflexive components, resulting 
in such processes as forgetting failures and remembering successes, making self-serving 
inferences, believing in the relative superiority of the self over others, engaging in downward 
social comparison, and presenting the self favorably to others. 
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to self-esteem maintenance and the evasion of negative emotions (e.g., disappointment, 
sadness, frustration), whereas the self-enhancement motive contributes to self-esteem 
elevation and the experience of positive emotions (e.g., contentment, pride, happiness). These 
conjectures are supported by research suggesting that a relatively high level of self-esteem 
and positive affectivity are linked with active engagement in everyday activities, creativity 
and planning, an optimistic attitude, improved coping, better psychological health (e.g., lower 
depression, anxiety, and loneliness), and better physical health (Baumeister, Campbell, 
Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; Fredrickson, 2001; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 
2003a, b). Also, high self-esteem and positive affectivity (e.g., extraversion, low neuroticism) 
can add to an individual’s appeal as a mate, thus improving chances of reproductive success. 
Reproductive success can also be promoted by the virtue of high self-esteem and positive 
affectivity facilitating dyadic interactions and group-level interactions: Individuals high in 
self-esteem and positive affectivity are perceived as competent and resourceful, and are thus 
more likely to be trusted upon for positions of responsibility within the group (Buss, 1989; 
Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994; Kenny & Zaccaro, 1983). Consequently, high self-esteem 
and positive affectivity maximize chances for advancement in the group hierarchy and 
minimize chances for social exclusion. Both outcomes, then, contribute to reproductive 
success, as high group status would be associated with successful mating and the offspring of 
high status members would be less likely to face neglect or social exclusion. 
  Learning motives, with their potential to clarify and enrich the self, would also have 
been adaptive to early humans when they led individuals to pursue, choose and construct 
tasks that are high rather than low in skill diagnosticity (Trope, 1983). Given that high 
diagnosticity tasks provide a definitive test of whether the organism possesses the underlying 
skill, they allow efficiency in later choices and time allocation decisions. For example, 
individuals may purposefully select tasks within particular domains (e.g., hunting, gathering, 
child rearing duties) that diagnostically assess their abilities to perform well in those domains. 
The ensuing accurate self-knowledge can be implemented in task planning, thus maximizing 
person-environment fit. Alternatively, if a deficiency is evident, the individual can either 
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or find ways to improve (e.g., practicing, engaging in technological innovation). Finally, 
individuals can utilize accurate skill knowledge to place themselves in suitable positions in 
the group hierarchy, thus minimizing disadvantageous conflict with conspecifics. Hence, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that the learning motives likely promoted reproductive fitness. 
In addition, learning motives may have served critical cognitive and affective 
functions for group members. The self-assessment motive reduces an individual’s uncertainty 
about self-attributes as well as aspects of the social and physical environment. Also, the self-
improvement motive elevates an individual’s sense of progress. This two-step benefit (i.e., 
reduction of uncertainty coupled with feelings of progress) contributes to personal adjustment 
and positive affectivity which (as discussed earlier) facilitate reproductive fitness. 
The homeostatic motive of self-verification stabilizes the representational aspect of the 
self through direction of attention to and solicitation of self-consistent feedback, biased (i.e., 
self-confirming) interpretation of ambiguous feedback, biased causal inferences, biased recall, 
and the prompting of self-corroborating behavior. Our hominid ancestors may have been 
prone to selecting tasks likely to confirm their notions of self-competence, a trend also 
observed in humans today. Also, the confirmation of self-beliefs afforded by task selection 
may have rendered the social environment more predictable and increased feelings of control 
over it, thus contributing to feelings of personal efficacy. Such feelings are highly adaptive, as 
they facilitate wiser decisions about energy expenditure, the setting of self-congruent goals 
and, more importantly, behavioral change to achieve these goals. These processes maximize 
outcome success and, in the long run, reproductive fitness. 
Reproductive fitness could have been maximized in another way. An individual may 
have solicited and received confirming feedback from group members regarding social 
standing, role expectations, and the behavioral repertoire necessary to carry out various roles. 
Such feedback would help the individual to avoid the energy waste that might accompany 
pursuit of goals incompatible with group objectives. Moreover, such feedback may also 
contribute to the warding off of negative emotions (e.g., shame, guilt, embarrassment) and the 
promotion of positive emotions (e.g., satisfaction, self-efficacy, pride) (Haidt & Keltner, this 
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It is perhaps important to emphasize here that social integration is a critical feature of 
all primate (including, obviously, humans) societies. This reflects the fact that primate social 
systems are implicit social contracts in which individual members need to be willing to delay 
immediate personal gratification in order to achieve greater advantages in the long term 
through cooperating to solve the problems of day to day survival. There is evidence to suggest 
that such tasks are cognitively much more demanding than the more conventional cognitive 
processing of physical percepts (Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998). The psychological 
processes that underpin the sense of self may play a critical role in enabling modern humans 
to integrate and bond their large social groups. And, if so, they may well have played an 
equally important role in allowing archaic humans to do the same in the somewhat smaller 
social groups in which they are likely to have lived (Aiello & Dunbar, 1993). These 
mechanisms can thus be seen as a natural outgrowth of the “social brain hypothesis” (Dunbar, 
1992, 1998). 
An Integrative View of the Self-Evaluation Process 
  We propose that self-evaluation motives operated synergistically rather than 
competitively in the prehistoric environment. That is, we assume that the three classes of 
motives were dynamically interrelated and served complementary purposes – and continue to 
do so today. Our evolutionary account emphasizes the modular nature of the symbolic self 
and the trade-off among different modules (i.e., self-evaluation motives). Nonetheless, we 
postulate that the self-evaluation process is predominantly guided by the valuation motives 
(Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Sedikides et al., 2004). Our 
proposal is fully compatible with findings attesting to the universality of both valuation 
motivation (Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides, 
Gaertner, & Vevea, in press) and self-esteem (Pyszczynski & Cox, 2004; Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004a, b; Sheldon, 2004).  
  As an example of the relevance of the valuation motives, consider the interplay 
between the three motive types in the context of the distinction between candid and tactical 
self-enhancement. Candid self-enhancement refers to flagrant attempts to increase the 
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achieved either through behaviors such as brute self-aggrandization (e.g., display of one’s 
physical prowess) or through denial of wrongdoing (e.g., as when one is caught subverting the 
status of dominant individuals). Such behaviors can often be directly linked to the action of 
valuation motives. Tactical self-enhancement, on the other hand, refers to indirect attempts to 
increase the positivity or decrease the negativity of the self. Tactical self-enhancement is 
sensitive to the social context and the balance between immediate and delayed rewards. This 
type of self-enhancement is often guided by the action of the learning and homeostatic 
motives. An example of tactical self-enhancement would be to restrain from challenging a 
higher-ranking conspecific or showing downright submission. However, despite the action of 
the learning and valuation motives in this domain, we see their action as secondary. In our 
view, the valuation motives generally will play a more important role in controlling the 
behaviors relevant to self-evaluation. 
  The affective consequences of the self-evaluation process likely follow a similar 
pattern of integration, but with the primary guiding role being played by the valuation 
motives. We speculate that self-enhancement increases self-esteem, self-verification induces 
feelings of control, self-assessment reduces uncertainty, and self-improvement instills 
feelings of progress. Although all of these motives are involved in the production of such 
feelings, we argue that control, certainty, and a sense of progress are critical to individuals 
because they are linked to the more basic desire for self-protection or self-enhancement.  
  In addition, we maintain that the self-evaluation process consists of two parts: 
information and action. Information refers to the generation and testing of hypotheses about 
the quality of the person-environment fit (e.g., “Am I strong enough to overthrow the higher-
ranking group member?”). This part reflects the extent to which the individual’s abilities 
match situational demands. The resulting data from the hypothesis-testing procedure could be 
used to carry out candid and, more often, tactical self-enhancement through action (e.g., 
coalition-building for bringing about change in the dominance hierarchy). Thus, the action 
component of the self-evaluation process (along with concurrent self-regulatory processes) 
pertains primarily to opportunistic responses to existing situations or to the strategic creation 
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be apparent from our discussion that we regard information and action as interdependent. To 
the extent that information about person-environment fit is veridical, likely to lead to 
improvement, and is self-verifying, resulting action will have a high probability of success 
because the individual can now make informative choices about favorable performance 
domains. Likewise, action success produces feedback about the validity of the behavior in 
question, the rate of behavioral improvement, and the verifying value of the information on 
which the behavior was based. 
  When the person-environment fit is high (i.e., when self-enhancement is carried out 
effectively through the information and action parts), feelings of individual self-esteem, 
control, certainty, and progress (as well as positive affectivity, in general) can be heightened. 
In our view, these self-esteem consequences are likely the most immediate outcome of the 
self-evaluation process. In addition to being relevant to the self, these feelings can also 
provide an essential gauge of the utility of the individual’s actions for the group (e.g., Did the 
group approve of the organism? Was rejection or exclusion a possibility? Should the 
organism persist along the same path or redirect action, instead?) (Leary & Baumeister, 
2000). In turn, the presence of these feelings is likely to increase one’s mate value (Brase & 
Guy, in press). 
  Despite the fact that heightened self esteem can be a guide to functional behavior, it is 
also the case that striving for self-esteem can sometimes lead to a suboptimal adaptive 
response (Crocker & Park, 2004). This suboptimality can result from a discrepancy between 
the adaptiveness of behaviors mandated by the information and by the action components of 
the self-evaluation process. Although we believe that the typical state of affairs is synergy 
between the information and action parts of the self-evaluation process, antagonism is also a 
possibility. What happens in these situations? 
We suggest that the activation of a particular motive depends on the trade-off between 
the value of veridical information and its emotional costs. On the one hand, admitting the 
veridicality of information that pertains to important domains (e.g., being inept at aspects of 
gathering or hunting tasks), can lead to serious affective consequences (e.g., depression, 
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dismissal, denial, or self-deception permits the individual to function with relative efficiency 
(e.g., perhaps by attempting to hone alternate skills), but could also inflict irreparable damage 
(e.g., being perceived as a cheater and being forced to eventual social exclusion). This 
conflict between candid self-enhancement objectives and long-term tactical self-enhancement 
objectives can assume other forms. For example, willingly giving up control to a more 
powerful group member may seem maladaptive, because it denotes acceptance of another’s 
superiority. However, control relinquishment can also be an effective or conflict-free strategy 
for satisfying long-term objectives such as gaining acceptance within a group (Rothbaum, 
Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). In such cases, a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis or motive 
prioritization can facilitate a balanced, successful, and, in the long term, adaptive response to 
a given situation. 
Still, which factors influence the activation of particular motives? We argue that 
motive activation depends on the dynamic interplay between the self-system and the 
environment. For example, high certainty about a self-attribute would render additional 
gathering of diagnostic information inefficient. In this situation, the self-assessment motive 
would be dormant or deactivated, whereas the self-verification motive would become 
accessible and would guide behavior that likely to confirm the self-attribute under 
consideration. Consequently, the individual would resist unwarranted self-knowledge changes 
and the integrity of the self-system would be preserved. Low self-certainty, on the other hand, 
could activate the self-assessment or self-improvement motive. Such activation would prompt 
the individual to master the contingencies necessary for informed and fruitful transactions 
with the environment. Regardless, the long-term demands for veridical, improving, and 
positively-verifying information might dictate that unflattering information about the self 
(i.e., one’s liabilities in a domain) be uncovered or disclosed in the short run.  
The organism’s response might also be contingent on perceptions of skill 
modifiability (Dunning, 1995). An individual might be predisposed to accept accurate 
feedback (i.e., self-assess) about a skill considered changeable and improvable through 
practice, but to self-protect by rejecting accurate feedback when the skill was considered 
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esteem, whereas self-assessment would be likely following a self-esteem boost (Sherman & 
Cohen, 2002). In addition, the organism’s response might depend on the availability of 
cognitive resources (Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990). Sometimes an 
immediately threatening event (e.g., public provocation by another group member) may 
require candid self-enhancement (e.g., display of physical prowess, vocal denial of the 
charges, verbal attack of the offensive opponent) rather than a deliberative response (Depret 
& Fiske, 1993). When the external threat, though, is not pressing (e.g., planning to overthrow 
and replace an ineffective leader), tactical self-enhancement (e.g., a deliberate and self-
presentational build up on one’s ability to self-assess and self-improve) can be more 
appropriate than an expedient response (Cummins, 1996). Finally, social context can 
influence motive activation. Tactical self-enhancement (e.g., modesty) can be the more 
sensible alternative when one is accountable for her or his behavior to other group members 
(Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002) or when presenting the self to persons familiar 
with the individual’s record (Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995). 
Evolution and the Valuation Motives: Summary and Recapitulation 
In writing and in processing these theoretical ideas, the main thrust of one’s argument 
sometimes gets lost in the technical details of the argument. Hence, we would like to take this 
opportunity to recapitulate our arguments with regards to evolution and the self motives in a 
more “bare bones” form. Most central to our argument is the notion that evolution favored 
individuals with strong valuation motives, with the other motives (learning and homeostatic) 
playing a role that is generally in the service of those valuation motives, not least because 
these ensured close integration of individuals within large, complexly organized social 
communities. 
In particular, we propose that the action of the valuation motives conferred three 
major adaptive advantages. First, these motives promote the adaptiveness of an individual’s 
self-system. These motives are crucial to effective choice behavior and success experiences 
that had emotional (e.g., self-esteem, self-efficacy), motivational (e.g., active engagement in 
daily activities, planning facilitation, persistence in the face of adversity), and physical health 
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Second, valuation motives improved an individual’s ability to engage in social 
interaction. As mentioned previously (Taylor et al., 2003a, b), valuation motives are 
negatively associated with mental distress (e.g., depression, anxiety, neuroticism, hostility) 
and positively associated with both mental health (e.g., high self-esteem, optimism, 
happiness, feelings of mastery and agency) and physical health or prowess. Mentally and 
physically healthy individuals are more likely than their distressed and weak counterparts to 
be seen as likeable, resourceful, and interpersonally attractive. Hence, those with strong 
(compared to those with weak) valuation motives are considered more attractive to others and 
are more likely to form positive interpersonal bonds with others. Functional valuation 
motives, then, are likely related to an individual’s perceived mate value and so contributed to 
their mating success.  
Third, functional and active valuation motives enhance an individual’s standing in the 
group. An agentic, mentally healthy, and interpersonally successful group member likely was 
perceived as someone who is deserving of the group’s trust and as someone who could 
effectively carry out collective tasks. Trust and acceptance promote an individual’s chances of 
moving up in the ranks of a group and of assuming a leadership role. Benefits from such a 
role would include increased probability of reproductive success and decreased probability of 
sanctions (e.g., social exclusion, bodily harm) directed either at the individual or her/his 
offspring. 
Epilogue 
  We set out to accomplish four objectives in this chapter. We began by addressing 
definitional issues regarding the construct of self. We then offered an updated timeline for the 
evolution of Homo sapiens, taking into consideration recent accounts that emphasize the non-
linear and disorderly course of evolution. Next, in the context of that timeline, we discussed 
when the human self originated. In the course of this discussion, we challenged Leary and 
Buttermore’s (2003) dating of self-emergence in the Upper Palaeolithic era (60-50 kya) on 
both evidential and logical grounds, and we reviewed evidence that bolsters our previous 
contention that glimmerings of the human self emerged at the end of the Homo 
ergaster/erectus period. Finally, we considered the functions of the self-evaluation process in Evolution of the Human Self  28  
the maintenance and propagation of the self and the species, and explored how the various 
human motives may have worked to enhance the evolutionary functionality of this process. 
We hypothesized that, while there are multiple motives that work integratively in this process, 
these motives generally work in the service of the valuation motives.  
  We believe that a good number of empirically testable hypotheses can be derived from 
our discussion. One example is the hypothesis that valuation motives enable an individual to 
cope more effectively with the demanding social pressures (e.g., alliance formation, 
competition with rivals) imposed by the complex and flexible social world of the human 
species. Another hypothesis is that valuation motive strength gives individuals direct 
interpersonal and reproductive advantages by increasing perceived mate value. Still, a third 
hypothesis is that valuation motive strength is associated with higher ranking in the group 
and, ultimately, with smoother group functioning. These hypotheses are empirically tractable 
on several levels. Both behavioral studies (e.g., linking valuation motive strength to adaptive 
functioning) and biological studies (e.g., linking valuation motive strength to specific genes 
or gene abnormalities) have the potential to lead to fruitful avenues of investigation. 
  Another promising line of research is a systematic examination of the interplay 
between the executive and reflexive components of the self-system and the conferred 
evolutionary benefits. Although we readily acknowledge the hypersociality of the Homo 
species, we also believe that what crucially separated humans from other animals is not 
necessarily relational or group life per se. Rather, it is the executive and reflexive capacity to 
approach and avoid relationships or groups. By using this reflexive capacity in this way, an 
individual is capable both of harvesting the benefits of relational and group life (e.g., 
protection from predators, food sharing, help in habitat construction) and escaping its costs 
(e.g., a sudden drop in the group competitive power, reduction in group size due to 
unfavorable antagonistic encounters, presence of parasites in the group as discussed in 
Kurzban & Leary, 2001). 
  We welcome the conduct of such research and look forward to its results. The ideas of 
natural selection and evolution are powerful, and as such they can be applied in ways that are 
very appealing, even in the absence of data. Consequently, it is all too easy to spin alternate Evolution of the Human Self  29  
tales of the action of evolution in the development of the human species, and often these 
contradictory tales can sound equally convincing. It is because of this that empirical data 
testing competing evolutionary hypotheses are urgently required. Indeed, it is the empirical 
exploration of the ideas about the design and functions of the human capability for self that 
we regard as a high-priority agenda item for social psychological research. Evolution of the Human Self  30  
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Footnotes 
  1 We should note that there some controversy as to whether Broca’s area is 
specifically a language area (Kan & Thompson-Schill, 2004). 
 
2 For the purposes of this discussion, we will use the umbrella term “human symbolic 
self” to refer to all three capacities, namely, representational, executive, and reflexive. 
  3 Some authors point to the importance of the location of the root of the tongue and 
the position of the hyoid bone in the speech production system (Nishimura,
 Mikami, Suzuki, 
& Matsuzawa, 2003). Evolution of the Human Self  42  
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